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SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND THE MORAL 
OBLIGATION OF DIRECTORS 
Mark J. Loewenstein* and Jay Geyer** 
ABSTRACT 
One of the most written-about and important topics in corporate law 
is the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors. Increasingly, 
critics of American capitalism have urged that corporations, and 
implicitly, corporate directors, act in a more socially responsible 
fashion and thus eschew the notion that shareholder primacy is the 
exclusive guide to a director’s fiduciary duty. Under this view, 
directors must consider the effect of their actions on “stakeholders” 
other than shareholders and be guided by morality—doing the right 
thing—when making business judgments. 
When directors move away from shareholder primacy, however, 
decision-making becomes more difficult and problematic. This 
article analyzes the arguments that underpin a rejection of 
shareholder primacy, alternatives to shareholder primacy, and the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate directors are under increasing pressure from outside of 
their corporations, and sometimes from their shareholders, to be more 
socially responsible.1 What that pressure demands is not altogether clear, 
but assume, for now, that there is a general consensus as to what 
constitutes a socially responsible corporation. The conventional wisdom 
is that directors in a typical business corporation are free to act in a 
socially responsible fashion if they can justify it as a business judgment 
in the best interests of the corporation.2 As long as that justification is 
provided, the courts are loathe to second-guess the directors, and almost 
never have, unless there was no rational basis for the chosen course of 
action.3 Still, the directors’ freedom of action is easier if the applicable 
law—the business corporation statute under which the corporation is 
 
 1. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 212 n.19 (1995). 
 2. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 3. Id. 
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organized—includes an “other-constituency” provision.4 This provision 
expressly allows directors to consider the impact of a potential course of 
action on constituencies other than the shareholders, including 
employees, consumers, suppliers, and the community or communities in 
which the corporation does business. A course of action can be justified 
even if it is not necessarily in the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, if another constituency benefits or is harmed by an 
alternative course of action the directors might have chosen.5 The recent 
advent of “benefit corporations” adds yet another layer to this inquiry; 
directors of a benefit corporation must take into account the impact of 
their chosen courses of action on the environment and society at large, 
as well as the “other constituencies” noted above.6 
The justifications for unmooring directors from their traditional 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders are many and 
varied. Some turn on the great wealth and power amassed by the modern 
corporation. Under this justification, corporations must, as a matter of 
necessity, act in a socially responsible fashion.7 Other justifications 
focus more on the impact that corporations have on society: Its 
proponents reason that corporations must therefore act to preserve and 
enhance societal goals.8 These and other arguments, described below, 
are, essentially, arguments by assertion: The proponents justify the 
result because it is the result that they want. What is lacking is an 
analysis explaining why and how directors should behave in the way 
that these critics want them to behave. 
This article grapples with this fundamental question from three 
perspectives. First, we consider the developing scholarship on 
“stakeholder theory,” an approach to corporate governance that holds 
that directors should consider the interests of persons and groups that are 
affected by, or that affect, a corporation. Second, we consider the moral 
autonomy of directors; should directors be free to consult their own 
moral and ethical principles in deciding corporate matters? The answers 
 
 4. Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it Got What it 
Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 249, 249–50 (2010). 
 5. Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 882 (2017). 
 6. Leo E. Strine, Making it Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?,  
4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 245–46 (2014). 
 7. See BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE 
PUBLIC 42–43 (2019). 
 8. Jeffrey Nesteruk, Corporations, Shareholders, and Moral Choice: A New 
Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 58 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 451, 453–54 
(1989). 
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may seem obvious, but operationalizing these individual moral 
judgments in a way that can be captured by the law is difficult, if not 
impossible. We thus consider in this context the analogous issue of a 
lawyer’s duty to zealously represent her client when such representation 
conflicts with a lawyer’s personal moral judgment. 
We then turn to a third rationale to justify a non-profit-maximizing 
approach to corporate governance, as set forth in Professor Joseph 
Heath’s recent book, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM.9 Heath 
calls for a “market failures approach” to business ethics: When there is a 
market failure, managers may not exploit that failure and, instead, 
should seek to do the right thing.10 A close analysis of this approach, 
however, suggests that it is more efficient to change the law to address 
market failures than to depend on the good will of corporate managers. 
Before concluding, we contrast these approaches to the corporate law 
that underpins the legitimacy of director conduct in the first instance; 
that is, the fiduciary relationship between the directors and the 
shareholders, beautifully articulated in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas 
Corp.11 How do these principles inform directors as to how they might 
act in a socially responsible way? Prior to considering these alternative 
approaches to director decision-making, it is important to set out the 
conventional understanding and, probably, the predominant norm for 
director conduct, the idea of shareholder primacy as a guiding principle 
and a manifestation of the ideas expressed in Blasius. 
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
A. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
Shareholder primacy is the theory in corporate law that the 
fiduciary duty of directors obligates them to make decisions that 
promote shareholder wealth maximization.12 Shareholders are the 
principals on whose behalf the firm is organized and are, at least in a 
sense, its owners. The idea of ownership, though controversial, rests on 
 
 9. See generally JOSEPH HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE 
MARKET FAILURES APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (2014). 
 10. Id. at 90. 
 11. 564 A.2d 651, 655 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 12. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277–78 
(1998); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2006). 
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the notion that under state corporate law, the shareholders elect the 
directors of the corporation and can enforce the directors’ fiduciary 
duties through derivative litigation.13 Consistent with the idea of 
ownership, early cases often refer to directors as trustees for the 
shareholders, implying that the directors managed property “owned” by 
their beneficiaries, the shareholders.14 In contrast to the shareholders, 
other constituents of the firm, such as employees and suppliers, depend 
on contracts (explicit or implicit) to define their rights. Shareholders 
lack explicit contracts and, to realize a return on their investment, 
depend on the directors to maximize the value of the firm.15 
The idea of shareholder ownership of the firm is controversial, or at 
least subject to challenge, because the traditional indicia of ownership 
are lacking. Technically, shareholders only own shares of stock, which 
ownership includes certain rights defined by statute, principally the right 
to elect directors, approve or veto fundamental corporate changes (for 
example, mergers, amendments to the articles of incorporation, 
dissolution), and receive the residual value of the firm on liquidation.16 
Scholars, who dispute the idea that shareholders own the corporation, 
note that shareholders lack control over the firm’s assets and lack power 
to direct those who do, the directors.17 In addition, as a practical matter, 
shareholders face considerable hurdles in electing directors beyond 
nominating the directors themselves.18 In publicly held corporations, the 
directors use corporate resources to prepare and circulate proxy 
statements to solicit proxies for their own election.19 Shareholders do not 
have access to these proxy statements (unless the bylaws so provide) 
and must bear the considerable expense of soliciting proxies 
themselves.20 
The right to bring derivative litigation must also be considered in 
context. Just as it is difficult for shareholders to exercise their right to 
elect directors, it is also difficult for them to discipline directors through 
 
 13. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1748. 
 14. See Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the 
Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 39 (2015); see also Gray v. 
President of Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, 378–79 (1807). 
 15. Weitzel & Rodgers, supra note 14, at 40. 
 16. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 547, 564–65 (2003). 
 17. Id. at 574. 
 18. Id. at 569. 
 19. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1737–38. 
 20. Id. at 1735. 
110 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
derivative litigation. Procedural hurdles,21 the ability of directors to 
dismiss the litigation,22 and the business judgment rule23 all make 
derivative litigation difficult and expensive. Under the business 
judgment rule, courts do not review the business judgments of directors 
unless the directors were conflicted or utterly failed to inform 
themselves when they made their decision.24 The shareholders who 
challenge directors’ business judgments bear the burden of proving the 
conflict or breach of the duty of care. 
Although directors still regard shareholders as the most important 
constituency, recently some directors have admitted that they factor 
other constituencies into their decision making.25 These directors explain 
that strict shareholder primacy may discourage non-shareholder 
constituents from making the types of firm-specific investments that can 
be essential to a company’s success.26 For example, a board of directors 
can make the decision to maximize shareholder wealth by selling the 
firm to the highest bidder. Or, taking into consideration the effects of the 
acquisition on non-shareholder constituents such as managers and other 
employees, the board can choose to sell to a lower bidder who offers 
commitments to those groups. If employees and managers really believe 
that the board of directors will sell to the highest bidder and not take 
their interests into account, then managers and employees will not 
devote themselves to the firm.27 Since an ex-ante policy of considering 
the effect of a sale on employees encourages firm-specific investment, it 
can be argued that it is consistent with shareholder primacy, that is, it is 
in the best interest of shareholders as a class over the long run.28 
However, in the short run, it affords directors discretion to refuse to 
maximize the wealth of the shareholders of a particular firm at a 
 
 21. Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 
525 (1992). 
 22. Id. at 505. 
 23. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Smith, supra note 12, at 290. 
 26. See id. at 282 (quoting David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: 
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell, ed., 1995)). 
 27. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75  
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1197–98 (2002). 
 28. Id. at 1198. 
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particular time in order to protect the extra-contractual expectations of 
essential non-shareholder groups, as well. 
The idea of shareholder primacy began to emerge in the nineteenth 
century. It grew in popularity during the 1930s, became widely accepted 
by the 1990s, and is considered, for the most part, the norm today.29 The 
development of derivative litigation in the nineteenth century was an 
early indication that directors should operate the corporation in the 
interest of the shareholders.30 For example, in Gray v. President of 
Portland Bank,31 Justice Samuel Sewall reasoned that the firm was the 
trustee of the shareholders, and therefore, it could not act except for the 
benefit of existing shareholders, thus supporting the notion that 
shareholders were the sole beneficiaries of the firm.32 In Robinson v. 
Smith,33 a shareholder brought a suit against the firm because the 
company failed to pursue mining operations, which was the purpose for 
which it was incorporated, and subsequently the firm incurred a 
substantial loss.34 The court found in favor of the shareholder and 
reasoned that directors willfully abused their duty of trust to the 
shareholders.35 
 
 29. In a highly publicized statement issued in August 2019, the Business 
Roundtable announced that the purpose of the corporation should be to benefit all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders. See Press Release, Business Roundtable Redefines 
the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote “An Economy That Serves All Americans” 
(August 19, 2019) (on file with author), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-
roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-
all-americans [https://perma.cc/599K-2P9L]. This statement, signed by 181 prominent 
CEOs, marked a stark departure from prior positions of the Business Roundtable, which 
previously had championed shareholder primacy. Id. Whether this shift in attitude will 
make a difference in board decision-making has been questioned. See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93 
S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155. The authors argue that 
corporate managers in states that had other-constituency statutes did not tend to protect 
non-shareholder constituencies in acquisitions but rather obtained gains for 
shareholders and themselves. Id. 
 30. Smith, supra note 12, at 304. 
 31. 3 Mass. 364 (1807). 
 32. Id. at 378–79; see also Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 
Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE UNIV.  
L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2013). 
 33. 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). 
 34. Id. at 223; accord Smith, supra note 12, at 308. 
 35. Smith, supra note 12, at 308 (quoting Robinson, 3 Paige Ch. at 222–23). 
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Because of the foundation laid by these cases, shareholder primacy 
theory began to gain universal acceptance. In 1919, the court in Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Company36 endorsed the shareholder primacy norm 
explicitly by stating that “a business corporation is organized and carried 
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”37 The idea that directors 
should act in the interests of the shareholders follows almost logically 
from state corporate statutes, which delegate to shareholders (and only 
to shareholders) the power to elect directors.38 Following the Dodge 
ruling, public companies began to solidify the idea of shareholder 
primacy in their corporate charters.39 
In general, and building on this legal history, four groups helped 
propel the shareholder primacy theory into the central theory in 
corporate governance. First, academics seeking to answer the question 
“what is the purpose of the corporation,” saw shareholder primacy as a 
logical answer.40 Second, “activist” investors, who, for instance, urged a 
corporation’s board to increase dividends or spinout unprofitable 
divisions or subsidiaries, helped create a culture in which shareholder 
primacy became the norm.41 Indeed, these activist investors explicitly or 
 
 36. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 37. Id. at 684. 
 38. Leo Strine, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and a 
leading scholar on corporate law, has repeatedly made the argument that corporate 
power is corporate purpose, meaning that because shareholders wield ultimate power 
within the corporation, the directors must (and do) operate the corporation to best serve 
them. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An 
Encouragement for Future Consideration From Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, 1166–68 (2017); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing 
Struggle With the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 135, 136 (2012); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-
Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015). 
Justice Strine does not argue that directors should ignore the interests of corporate 
constituencies counter to shareholders’ interests, but instead argues that current law–by 
structure and design–precludes them from doing so and, in his experience, effectively 
so. See id. 
 39. Stout, supra note 27, at 1180. 
 40. Id. at 1174. 
 41. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: 
Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 
19–20 (2016) (explaining how activist investors have used the leverage of large 
shareholdings and appraisal litigation to discipline corporate management. 
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implicitly threatened the tenure of corporate managers who failed to 
prioritize shareholder wealth. Third, policy entrepreneurs such as 
academics and business consultants, argued that to improve corporate 
governance, boards of directors must embrace shareholder primacy as 
the norm. Prominent among these academics was Milton Friedman, who 
argued in a widely read New York Times essay that the only purpose of 
a corporation was the pursuit of profit, a basic tenet of the shareholder 
primacy norm.42 Fourth, CEOs and executives accepted shareholder 
primacy because it suggested that the obvious metric to determine the 
value of the corporation should be stock price, and stock price turned 
out to be something that was relatively easy for executives to 
manipulate, at least in the short run.43 
By the early 1990s, shareholder primacy was a widely accepted 
theory, and, in a sense, was enshrined in the Internal Revenue Code in a 
1993 provision.44 Responding to popular concerns that executive 
compensation was excessive, Congress amended the tax code to limit 
the deductibility of executive compensation to $1,000,000 unless the 
excess compensation was performance-based.45 To comply with this 
requirement, corporations typically granted executives qualified stock 
options, which were only valuable to the recipient if the stock price rose. 
Incentivizing corporate actors to maximize share price, of course, is 
consonant with the idea of shareholder primacy. 
B. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
A growing body of scholarship promotes the idea that in decision-
making, corporate directors should take into account the effect of their 
actions on the corporation’s stakeholders. This includes, at the least, the 
corporation’s employees, creditors, suppliers, and the communities in 
which the corporation has facilities, in addition to the corporation’s 
shareholders. Stakeholder theory is thus in profound conflict with the 
idea of shareholder primacy. 
 
Interestingly, the article accepts, without discussion, that the goal of the corporation is 
to maximize shareholder returns). 
 42. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17. 
 43. Stout, supra note 27, at 1176. 
 44. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m). 
 45. In 2017, § 162(m) was amended to remove the exception for performance-
based pay. Id. 
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Advocated for many years, stakeholder theory is of great interest, 
especially in the current sociopolitical climate. One of the leading 
theorists, Professor R. Edward Freeman, has written extensively on the 
topic.46 In STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH,47 
Freeman identifies the various stakeholders of a firm, which he defines 
generally as “any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, 
the achievement of a corporation’s purpose. Stakeholders include 
employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, 
environmentalists, government and other groups who can help or hurt 
the corporation.”48 The crux of his thesis is that corporations have not 
been managed with a view toward dealing with each of these 
stakeholders, and effective management requires that they do so.49 In 
other words, the emphasis appears to be on increasing the corporation’s 
long-term success. He argues that “if business organizations are to be 
successful in the current and future environment . . . executives must 
take multiple stakeholder groups into account.”50 Freeman’s argument 
for a stakeholder philosophy starts from the presumption that 
globalization, increased competition, and other factors have increased 
the challenges facing corporate management; he argues that a 
stakeholder approach is the best way to successfully navigate these 
changes. But the idea that corporate management has not understood the 
importance of, for instance, maintaining a loyal workforce or supplier 
network to effectively compete in a global market seems, on its face, 
implausible. 
Further, Freeman seeks to distinguish his approach to corporate 
management from the corporate social responsibility movement. He 
argues that advocates of the latter do not fully appreciate the importance 
of integrating social responsibility with managers’ strategic thinking: 
“corporate social responsibility literature . . . has failed to indicate ways 
 
 46. See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, J.S. HARRISON, A.C. WICKS, ET. AL., 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART (2010); STAKEHOLDERS (R. Edward 
Freeman & Robert A. Phillips, eds., 2010); Jacob Hörisch, R. Edward Freeman, and 
Stefan Schaltegger, Applying Stakeholder Theory in Sustainability Management: Links, 
Similarities, Dissimilarities, and a Conceptual Framework, 27 ORGS. & ENV’T 4 (May 
27, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026614535786. 
 47. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010). 
 48. Id. at vi. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 52. 
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of integrating these concerns into the strategic systems of the 
corporation in a non-ad hoc fashion.”51 In other words, corporate social 
responsibility is only one aspect of the many internal and external 
challenges that managers face. Freeman concedes that dealing with 
outside stakeholders is voluntary,52 but describes how negotiating with, 
say, a consumer group, is better than a “hardball” tactic of non-
negotiating.53 It appears that in the 30 years since Freeman published 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, no distinction is currently recognized 
between those advocating greater corporate social responsibility and 
proponents of a stakeholder theory of corporate management. 
In any case, unlike shareholder primacy, which has a well-accepted 
definition, the parameters of stakeholder theory vary from proponent to 
proponent. Some advocates for stakeholder theory argue that directors 
should consider all individuals and groups that are affected by corporate 
actions.54 At its extreme, of course, the affected stakeholders are without 
limit under such a definition. A corporation that, for instance, 
manufactures airplanes and buys engines from an engine manufacturer 
has an effect on that supplier and its stakeholders, as well as on every 
company in the engine manufacturer’s supply chain and their respective 
stakeholders. Weighing the effects of its decisions on such a large and 
far-flung supply chain may be a nearly impossible task. Stakeholder 
theorists readily suggest such an obligation but do not grapple with its 
practical implications.55 
In addition to a diversity of views on who should be considered a 
stakeholder, stakeholder theorists propose various rationales to justify or 
support their theory: 
1. Large corporations affect the lives of a broad range of 
individuals and have an outsized influence on the economy and the 
public interest.56 
 
 51. Id. at 40. 
 52. Id. at 74. 
 53. See id. at 75–76. 
 54. Keay, supra note 4, at 256–57. 
 55. Spencer J. Hazan, Note, Considering Stakeholders in M&A, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 749, 755 (2020). 
 56. See, e.g., ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 7 (Hart Publ’g 
Ltd. 2015). 
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2. Outside groups, in addition to shareholders, contribute to a 
corporation’s capital and, therefore, “should have claims on a 
corporation’s assets and earnings.”57 
3. Considering the various constituencies that contribute to a 
corporation’s profitability benefits the corporation because these 
constituencies will be more loyal to the corporation.58 
4. Because many groups and individuals who deal with or are 
affected by a corporation do not have explicit contracts, there is an 
implicit understanding that their interests will be considered by 
corporate decision makers.59 
5. Stakeholder protection is a matter of recognizing the 
human rights of those stakeholders.60  
However, none of these rationales are persuasive upon further 
interrogation. The following considers each in turn. 
1. The Outsized Effect of Corporations 
Assuming the truth of the assertion that corporate policy has an 
outsized effect on individuals and the economy, it does not necessarily 
follow that the corporation has to consider each stakeholder in its 
decision making. To the extent that stakeholders are individuals, they 
have political processes available to them to affect corporate behavior. 
If, for instance, the claim is that a corporation should provide paid 
parental leave for its employees, it is more efficient for citizens to lobby 
their elected officials to change the law than for employees of multiple 
corporations to lobby their employers for a new benefit. Such a law 
would presumably not disadvantage one employer over others, while a 
piecemeal approach to the problem would. Moreover, the interests of 
stakeholders often conflict; what benefits consumers, for instance lower 
 
 57. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1171 (1993). 
 58. See, e.g., Keay, supra note 4, at 265; see also John Plender, Giving People a 
Stake in the Future, 31 LONG RANGE PLAN. 211, 215 (1998). 
 59. See, e.g., Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A 
Proposed Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 589, 622 (1997). 
 60. See, e.g., Robert Phillips, R. Edward Freeman & Andrew C. Wicks, What 
Stakeholder Theory Is Not, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 479, 494 (2003). 
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prices, adversely affects other stakeholders, such as shareholders and 
employees. A policy that benefits suppliers, for instance higher prices 
for inputs, disadvantages other stakeholders, such as consumers. There 
is no principled way to weigh these competing interests, and resolving 
them in any way other than what maximizes profits will adversely affect 
the corporation’s ability to compete, which in the end disadvantages all 
stakeholders. 
2. Contribution of Capital by Stakeholders 
This claim about non-shareholders is specious at best. In relation to 
a corporation, “capital” is normally thought of as financial assets, 
tangible machinery, and equipment employed to produce goods and 
services.61 In her article Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 
Professor Roberta Karmel notes that employees make a “financial 
contribution to the corporation . . . in the form of human capital”62 and 
that communities provide capital in the form of “governmental services 
to the business and its employees.”63 Professor Karmel recognizes the 
shortcomings of this approach, writing, “it is difficult to weave any 
theory as to how [customers and suppliers] supply a corporation with 
capital unless they are providers of trade credit.”64 This observation 
reveals that the argument reduces to a rhetorical device and, like the 
“outsized effect” claim, cannot support its conclusion. Instead of 
providing capital, various stakeholders provide goods and services that 
the corporation needs to utilize the capital supplied by its equity and 
debt investors. In addition, many proponents of stakeholder theory 
would include the “environment” as a stakeholder.65 Arguing that the 
environment provides capital is, of course, absurd. Individuals and 
entities that transact business with the corporation do so on terms that 
are agreeable to the parties. There is no reason to characterize the 
consideration provided by each of the corporation’s counterparties as 
“capital.” To do so would drain the term “capital” of any meaning. 
 
 61. Marshall Hargrave, Capital, INVESTOPEDIA (March 26, 2020), 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capital.asp [https://perma.cc/BLN2-W7LW]. In 
order to qualify as capital, the goods must provide an ongoing service to the business to 
create wealth. See id. 
 62. Karmel, supra note 51, at 1171. 
 63. Id. at 1171–72. 
 64. Id. at 1172. 
 65. Keay, supra note 4, at 271. 
 
118 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
3. The Corporation Benefits From Protecting Stakeholders 
This is perhaps the weakest argument, because it is not a rationale 
at all. If a corporation would realize enhanced returns because, for 
instance, it weighed the effect of its employment policies on the 
productivity and loyalty of its work force, then it would do so under a 
profit maximization philosophy, and stakeholder theory would become 
redundant. There is also a paternalistic undertone to this argument, 
suggesting that corporate decision makers are not fully capable of 
determining what policies are most profitable. Further, and worse yet, 
the critics outside the corporation are more capable than the corporate 
managers. For example, some corporations provide on-site daycare for 
children of their employees. They do so not because the relevant 
decision makers are “good folks” who have their employees’ best 
interests at heart, but rather because the policy enhances employee 
productivity and recruitment. For other employers, however, the 
increase in productivity would not justify the added expense, and 
recruitment is not a problem. If an employer were to provide a benefit 
and its competitors did not, that employer might be at a competitive 
disadvantage which, in turn, could adversely affect the very employees 
in question. 
4. Implicit Understanding 
It is inevitable, of course, that in making decisions, corporate actors 
consider the effect of their decisions on stakeholders that are most 
directly affected by those decisions. Deciding how to price the 
corporation’s goods or services requires a predictive analysis of 
consumer response. For example, deciding whether to declare additional 
paid holidays for employees is often motivated by a belief that 
employees will respond favorably. Moreover, for each decision, 
directors must (and inevitably do) consider the effect on the firm’s 
bottom line. So, at one level, the “implicit understanding” rationale does 
not support an argument that stakeholder theory is different from 
principles of traditional corporate governance. This rationale may have 
force, however, if the corporate decision makers are expected to 
consider the effect of their decisions on stakeholders who are indirectly 
affected. For instance, using the example from above, if a corporation is 
considering providing a free daycare facility on its premises for children 
of its employees, should (or must) the board consider the effect on 
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daycare providers in the community? Posing the question suggests two 
additional questions: How would they weigh the interests of the 
community daycare providers? And what is the source of the implicit 
agreement upon which the outside daycare providers rely under this 
rationale? 
As to how the interest of the outside providers would be weighed, 
the answer is that there is no principled way to do so. Indeed, in terms of 
time, it is hard to justify the cost of making the attempt. And, as to the 
source of the implicit understanding, there is none. Basic contract 
doctrine suggests that an “implied” contract between two parties exists 
under two circumstances. The first is when the facts suggest that both 
parties intended that there be an agreement,66 and the second is when, 
for various policy reasons, the law imposes a contractual (or quasi-
contractual) obligation on a person.67 The former arises when the words 
and actions of the parties support the inference that they intended to be 
bound to one another, although an explicit understanding is lacking. The 
latter relates to situations in which one party enriched another party and 
a court determines that it would be unjust if the benefited party did not 
compensate the benefit provider.68 Neither circumstance is implicated in 
this rationale for the stakeholder theory. 
5. Human Rights 
The argument that the failure to consider the interest of a 
stakeholder violates the human rights of that stakeholder69 is simply an 
argument by assertion. Rights do not emerge from thin air; they must 
have a basis in law, whether statutory, constitutional, or, at the least, 
natural law. That corporate stakeholders have a human right in relation 
 
 66. Will Kenton, Implied Contract, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 12, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/implied_contract.asp [https://perma.cc/PK8K-
BJV3] (“An implied contract is a legally-binding obligation that derives from actions, 
conduct, or circumstances of one or more parties in an agreement.”). 
 67. Will Kenton, Quasi Contract, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 29, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quasi-contract.asp [https://perma.cc/SGX4-
DGRL] (“It is created by a judge to correct a circumstance in which one party acquires 
something at the expense of the other. The contract aims to prevent one party from 
unfairly benefiting from the situation at the other party’s expense.”). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM.  
L. INST. 2011). 
 69. Keay, supra note 4, at 268. 
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to a corporation is a statement that is creative but lacking in explanatory 
power. 
In short, there is no persuasive rationale supporting the theory that 
directors (and, indeed, other corporate actors) should consider the 
interests of all stakeholders when making business decisions. Moreover, 
as indicated above, the requirement they do so is without adequate 
guidance. Essentially, any such decision would not be subject to a 
meaningful review, and the decision makers would be unaccountable. 
By contrast, the theory of shareholder primacy is relatively easy to 
articulate and is easy for decision makers to implement. As a result, 
decision makers can be (and often are) held accountable.70 
While stakeholder theory seems to lack a convincing rationale, its 
popularity may already be affecting corporate behavior. Professor Lisa 
Fairfax, in her article The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of 
Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, suggests that stakeholder 
theory is shaping the way directors behave, a view shared by other 
theorists.71 She concludes: 
In contrast to those who discount this shift, this Article argues that 
the rhetorical embrace of stakeholder rhetoric has important 
normative repercussions. Focusing on the intrinsic value of rhetoric 
as a persuasive and expressive device, this Article argues that such 
rhetoric reveals normative dissatisfaction with shareholder primacy 
that extends to both customers and employees as well as the business 
community and investors. Even if temporary, the rhetoric reveals 
some societal and investor discontent with the prevailing shareholder 
primacy principle.72 
Even conceding, however, that the rhetoric is a “persuasive and 
expressive device,” it is unclear that corporate actors have embraced 
stakeholder balancing as a norm of behavior.73 Many instances which 
Fairfax cites as evidence would be far more persuasive if the corporation 
in question had proposed an amendment to its articles, embraced a 
 
 70. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2020 WL 
425965, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2020). 
 71. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder 
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 678 (2006). 
 72. Id. at 712. 
 73. Cf. id. at 690–98 (citing stakeholder rhetoric in corporate annual reports, codes 
of conduct, and business school curricula, as well as the creation of internal compliance 
and ethics infrastructures, as evidence of a normative shift). 
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stakeholder theory, or, better still, re-incorporated in a jurisdiction with 
an other-constituency statute. In other words, if a board of directors 
were committed to a stakeholder approach, its commitment would be 
more persuasive if the board disclosed its intentions in ways that the law 
readily affords. 
If investors preferred a stakeholder philosophy, and, if boards of 
directors were operating under such a philosophy, we would expect 
boards to propose amendments to the articles of incorporation or bylaws 
that welcome shareholder proposals that further stakeholder concerns. 
That does not appear to be the case. Shareholders frequently present 
environmental and social proposals to be voted upon at the annual 
shareholders meeting pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-8.74 As a general matter, 
the number of such proposals increases each year.75 In 2017, for 
instance, shareholders submitted some 345 proposals related to 
environmental and social issues to public companies for presentation at 
shareholder meetings, which amounted to 56% of all shareholder 
proposals.76 Also, in 2017, environmentally-related proposals had 
overall shareholder support of 20%. Proposals typically supported by 
known proxy advisory firms averaged between 23% and 42% 
shareholder support, while “other” proposals typically received 20% or 
less shareholder support.77 Moreover, other companies, primarily in the 
technology and financial services sectors, have filed shareholder 
 
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011); see also Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: 
Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. 983, 
1027 (2020). 
 75. Holly J. Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas & Claire H. Holland, Corporate 
Governance: United States, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 252, 268 (2019); A Look at 
Governance Shareholder Proposals in 2015, INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. (2020), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/library/a-look-at-governance-shareholder-proposals-in-
2015/ [https://perma.cc/RJ9B-B6NC]. 
 76. Becky L. Jacobs, Milton Friedman Has a Lot to Answer for: A Response to 
Joshua Fershee’s “Long Live Director Primacy: Social Benefit Entities and the 
Downfall of Social Responsibility,” 19 TRANSACTIONS 391, 400 (2017) (citing Ronald 
O. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 
Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/12/shareholder-proposal-developments-
during-the-2017-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/346F-C6BM]). 
 77. James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, Climate-Change Proposals Break 
Through, PROXY MONITOR (2017), http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2017Finding1
.aspx [https://perma.cc/3AZ7-BER6]. Such “other” proposals included those seeking 
the appointment of independent directors with environmental expertise or linking 
executive compensation to sustainability metrics. See id. 
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proposals in recent years to close identified gender pay gaps.78 Thus, the 
empirical evidence suggests that boards are not embracing an easy way 
to integrate stakeholder philosophy in their governance structure.79 
C. THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY 
In A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,80 Professors 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argue for a team approach to corporate 
law; that is, the board of directors acts as a mediating institution that 
must divide profits among all who provide capital to the corporation. 
The division includes not only shareholders, but also employees, who 
provide human capital, managers, and others. This is thus a modified 
stakeholder theory, and purports to be both normative and descriptive. 
Their theory is that team production keeps shareholders and others from 
using firm-specific assets opportunistically. In their words: 
[B]y putting control over the firm’s assets and outputs in the hands 
of the board (whose members are precluded by law from using that 
control for their own personal benefit), corporate law prevents 
shareholders, managers, and other team members from using such 
control to opportunistically expropriate rents from the team.81  
The team production concept is that all of these parties who 
contribute “capital” do so on the implicit understanding that their 
 
 78. Gregory, Grapsas & Holland, supra note 75, at 269. 
 79. In Social Responsibility Resolutions, Scott Hirst argues that the low numbers of 
favorable votes for social responsibility resolutions may be distorted because of the 
voting by mutual funds, which own, in the aggregate, about 24% of the equity in U.S. 
corporations. 43 UNIV. IOWA J. CORP. L. 217, 220 (2018). Hirst suggests that polling 
data indicates that, on some issues (principally resolutions relating to disclosure of 
corporate political spending and shareholder approval of proposed political spending), 
investor preferences are not consistent with voting by those funds. Id. at 230. Funds are 
likely to vote against those resolutions, but if given the choice, investors would favor 
them. Id. As Hirst concedes, the polling data is somewhat suspect and, of course, 
mutual funds presumably vote their shares in the way that they believe is in the best 
interests of their investors. Id. at 233–34. 
 80. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 315–16 (1999). 
 81. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business 
Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 746 (1999). 
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contribution will be managed by the board of directors not only in the 
shareholders’ interests, but in theirs as well.82 
This notion–really an assumption–of an “implicit understanding” is 
convenient indeed, but lacking as a matter of fact and law. As a simple 
example, do managers, who have explicit contracts with the corporation, 
also have an implicit understanding that the board will manage the 
corporation in their interests, at least to some extent? What would be the 
basis for their understanding? However, even conceding that point, the 
authors lack a rubric for how the corporate profits would be divided. 
The authors suggest that “the returns to any particular corporate 
stakeholder from participating in the corporation will be determined not 
only by market forces, but by political forces.”83 This process is largely 
one of negotiation by the relevant stakeholder. 
Interestingly, the authors note the share of corporate returns going 
to shareholders has increased (in the period before the publication of 
their article) and attribute this to market forces: To attract capital, 
shareholder returns had to increase and, at the same time, technological 
advances and lower rates of unionization weakened the hand of labor. 
We believe it is fair to say that both before and after the appearance of 
this article, management decisions were heavily influenced by market 
forces. Team production merely describes management’s need to 
respond to market forces with respect to each input of production. Blair 
and Stout conclude their article with the observation that boards as 
 
 82. Professor Stout has written extensively and critically about the shareholder 
primacy norm. She is of the view that there is no justification in law or economics to 
justify the norm. See Lynn A. Stout, The Dumbest Business Idea Ever. The Myth of 
Maximizing Shareholder Value, EVONOMICS (Mar. 15, 2016), http://evonomics.com/
maximizing-shareholder-value-dumbest-idea/ [https://perma.cc/VCS7-7NH7]. Stout 
argues that corporate actors should satisfice: 
Satisficing has many advantages as a corporate decision-making strategy. Most 
obviously, it does not try to resolve conflicts among different shareholders by 
maximizing only the interests of the small subset who are most short-term, 
opportunistic, undiversified, and asocial. It allows managers instead to try to 
decently (but not perfectly) serve the interests of many different shareholders–
including long-term shareholders; shareholders who want the company to be able 
to keep commitments to customers and employees; diversified shareholders who 
want to avoid damaging their other interests as investors, employees, and 
consumers; and prosocial shareholders who want the company to earn profits in a 
socially and environmentally responsible fashion. 
Id.; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on 
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
667, 680–86 (2003). 
 83. See Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 325 (emphasis added). 
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mediating hierarchies explains corporate law, but that the increasing 
rhetoric about shareholder primacy poses the threat that the law may 
change to enhance shareholder primacy, and that would be a bad thing.84 
With that, the article is both descriptive and normative. 
While it is true that (some) employees make firm-specific 
investments of human capital in the firm, many do not, or the value of 
their human capital investment is limited. Some employees who do 
make significant investments of human capital in the firm could possibly 
be in a position to contract for these investments. Shareholders are 
always residual claimants, dependent on management’s good faith for a 
return on their investment. 
Thus, one major problem with the theory is to determine when to 
treat employees as “investors,” and when to treat them as being 
adequately protected and compensated for their investment. For an 
extreme example, think about a CEO with a munificent contract; is she 
entitled to more? What about a software engineer with stock options? At 
the other extreme, how entitled are unskilled or semi-skilled factory 
workers? Why wouldn’t corporate management compensate them for 
their contributions so as to encourage their productivity and loyalty, 
given that such outcomes are best for the profitability of the firm? If 
management fails to do so, it is acting inconsistently with its traditional 
fiduciary duties and can be held accountable on that basis. As to making 
that judgment, the courts have traditionally deferred to the board of 
directors under the umbrella of the business judgment rule.85 
Blair & Stout cite several well-known corporate law cases as proof 
that the team production model describes the current state of corporate 
law.86 We do not believe that the team production model is an accurate 
 
 84. Id. at 326–27. 
 85. See, e.g., Parnes v. Bally Ent. Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999). 
The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” 
Where, as here, there is no claim that enhanced judicial scrutiny is required 
because of the nature of the transaction, to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff 
must allege well pleaded facts to overcome the presumption.” 
The presumptive validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases 
where the decision under attack is “so far beyond the bounds of reasonable 
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad 
faith.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 86. See Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 301–304. 
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description of corporate governance. For instance, after distinguishing 
Dodge, discussed above, as essentially a dispute between shareholders, 
Blair & Stout cite Shlensky v. Wrigley,87 Credit Lyonnaise Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,88 Cheff v. Mathes,89 
and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.90 as examples of 
courts endorsing the role of boards as mediators among corporate 
constituencies (thereby rejecting shareholder primacy theory). While 
there is some support for that conclusion, when read objectively, the 
cases do not go nearly that far. 
In Shlensky, the court sided with the directors of the Chicago 
National League Ball Club Inc., a Delaware corporation that owned and 
operated the Chicago Cubs.91 The plaintiff challenged the directors to 
install lights and schedule night games, with a goal of increasing the 
profitability of the corporation.92 The board refused, citing the adverse 
effect that night games would have on the neighborhood surrounding the 
ballpark.93 The court sided with the directors in this derivative action, 
but Blair & Stout argued that the board was mediating between the 
shareholders and the residents in the community, who did not want night 
games in their neighborhood.94 However, the court seemed to be 
persuaded by–or at least was unwilling to second guess–the directors’ 
argument that the corporation was better off, in the long run, if the 
neighborhood remained stable and safe, which might not be the case if 
night games were regularly played there.95 Shlensky is thus a classic 
example of a court deferring to the business judgment of an unconflicted 
board. To suggest that the board forwent a more profitable course of 
action merely to accommodate the community is just speculation and 
requires one to believe that the court was being dishonest when it wrote: 
“we are not satisfied that the motives assigned to Phillip K. Wrigley [the 
controlling shareholder], and through him to the other directors, are 
contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the stockholders.”96 
 
 87. 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 88. No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 89. 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964). 
 90. 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). 
 91. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 781. 
 92. Id. at 777. 
 93. Id. at 778. 
 94. Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 303. 
 95. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780. 
 96. Id. 
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Credit Lyonnaise, a second case cited by Blair & Stout, is even less 
helpful to their thesis. The Chancery Court opinion in Credit Lyonnaise 
included a footnote suggesting that when a corporation enters the zone 
of insolvency, the board of directors should consider the interests of 
creditors, not just shareholders.97 Though clearly intended as a dictum, 
this notion is arguably consistent with Blair & Stout’s thesis. But the 
Credit Lyonnaise dictum was rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court 
in its 2007 North American Catholic Education Programming 
Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla decision: “Recognizing that directors of 
an insolvent corporation owe direct fiduciary duties to creditors would 
create uncertainty for directors who have a fiduciary duty to exercise 
their business judgment in the best interest of the insolvent 
corporation.”98 
Blair & Stout also offer Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time 
Inc. as an example of a Delaware court rejecting shareholder primacy.99 
The Delaware Supreme Court deferred to the Time board, which had 
rejected Paramount’s generous offer for Time stock if Time would 
abandon a planned merger with Warner.100 However, to the extent that 
this case is contrary to the theory of shareholder primacy (which is itself 
highly questionable), it has been recognized as an outlier in the 
Delaware jurisprudence attributable to its somewhat unique facts.101 In 
addition, subsequent Delaware cases can only be understood as 
reflecting shareholder primacy.102 And, importantly, the Paramount v. 
Time court did not indicate it was overruling its earlier decision in 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.103 or the definitive 
language in Revlon affirming shareholder primacy: “A board may have 
regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the 
 
 97. Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. Civ. A. 
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 98. 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 99. Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 309. 
 100. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) 
 101. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–47 
(Del. 1994) (distinguishing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. on its facts). 
 102. See id.; see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 
(Del. 2003); QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1266 
(Del. Ch. 1993). 
 103. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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stockholders.”104 Blair & Stout seek to distinguish Revlon and its 
statement of shareholder primacy: 
On first inspection, this language appears to support shareholder 
primacy. Closer analysis suggests, however, that Revlon may in fact 
support the mediating hierarchy model. Although the Revlon opinion 
did not clarify what it meant to say that a company’s “break-up” was 
“inevitable,” in subsequent cases Revlon has been interpreted to 
apply “[w]hen a majority of a corporation’s voting shares are [to be] 
acquired by a single person or entity, or by a cohesive group acting 
together.” In other words, Revlon applies when a formerly publicly 
held corporation is about to become essentially a privately held firm. 
As noted earlier, in closely held firms subject to the control of a 
single shareholder or group of shareholders, directors enjoy 
relatively little independence and can no longer function effectively 
as mediating hierarchs. Thus the Revlon exception to the general rule 
may reflect an intuitive judicial recognition that when a firm “goes 
private,” it abandons the mediating hierarchy approach in favor of a 
grand-design principal-agent structure dominated by a controlling 
shareholder.105 
Blair & Stout’s reading of Revlon is plausible, but forced, because 
Revlon applies not only when a firm goes private, but also when it is to 
be liquidated.106 Blair & Stout essentially argue that the Delaware courts 
should not be taken at their word, but we see no reason not to do so. 
Those unconvinced by this analysis need look no further than the recent 
observations of the erstwhile Chief Justice of Delaware Supreme Court, 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., who dismissed the idea that courts, or at least the 
Delaware courts, do not mean what they say.107 
II. THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF DIRECTORS 
Since stakeholder theorists seek to reorient the decisional priorities 
of corporate directors, they might be satisfied with a norm that director 
 
 104. Id. at 182. 
 105. Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 309. 
 106. The Delaware Supreme Court made this clear in Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. 
QVC Network, Inc.: “Accordingly, when a corporation undertakes a transaction which 
will cause: (a) a change in corporate control; or (b) a break-up of the corporate entity, 
the directors’ obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available to the 
stockholders.” 637 A.2d at 48. 
 107. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My 
Hometown 4 (Univ. Pa. L. Sch. Inst. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 16-34, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906875. 
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actions should be informed by moral principles. What appears to be 
objectionable to stakeholder theorists about the shareholder primacy 
norm is that it has overtones of avarice and greed, and causes harm to 
third parties—clearly immoral impulses. Under this analysis, directors 
who are free to act morally will naturally consider the effect of their 
actions on the corporation’s various stakeholders. 
While stakeholder theorists typically do not cite such principles to 
support their theory, a broad concept of morality could support a norm 
that corporate directors must consider the effect of their actions on 
remote individuals and entities that do not have a direct stake in the 
corporation. Moreover, and aside from the views of stakeholder 
theorists, a norm that supports or requires that directors act ethically 
seems unassailable. However, such a norm is not easily operationalized, 
and thus not a viable legal alternative to shareholder primacy.108 
Nearly all theories governing what actions are morally permissible 
fall into one of three families—consequentialism, deontology, or virtue 
ethics. To illustrate the problems with charging corporate directors and 
managers to simply act morally as an alternative to shareholder primacy, 
we need only discuss the first of these families of theories in significant 
detail. According to consequentialism, an action is right if and only if it 
produces the right consequences.109 Consequentialist theories differ 
depending on which consequences are deemed relevant and what counts 
as a right configuration of consequences. One such theory, Act 
Utilitarianism, is most frequently interpreted as requiring that an action 
maximize utility.110 “Utility” in this context typically denotes whatever 
 
 108. A note on terminology: The terms “ethics” and “morals” are sometimes 
understood to involve slightly different shades of meaning. For our purposes here, we 
will consider them interchangeable, although we will generally use “moral” and its 
variants throughout. 
 109. Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil., Consequentialism (2003) (rev. Jun. 3, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ [https://perma.cc/H9H5-B3QD]. 
 110. Works by major figures in the development of Act Utilitarianism include 
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (Doubleday 1961) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger 
Crisp ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1861); and HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS 
OF ETHICS (London, Macmillan & Co. 1874). See generally Jeremy Bentham, 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE MAKING OF MODERN LAW: LEGAL 
TREATISES, 1800-1926 (Clarendon Press, 1876); John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in 
THE MAKING OF MODERN LAW: LEGAL TREATISES, 1800-1926 (Clarendon Press, 1876); 
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, in THE MAKING OF MODERN LAW: LEGAL 
TREATISES, 1800-1926 (Clarendon Press, 1876). 
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value makes people’s lives better. Most Utilitarians are also Hedonists, 
meaning that they consider happiness to be the only thing that ultimately 
makes life better; or conversely worse, in the case of unhappiness. The 
most common articulation of Act Utilitarianism directs us to act in such 
a way that we create the greatest net balance of happiness over 
unhappiness. If Act Utilitarianism is interpreted as being concerned with 
expected happiness instead of actual happiness, then morally right 
actions will only be those that we have good reason to believe will 
create the greatest probability-weighted happiness. 
Suppose a director believes that there is a 50% chance that the 
economy will slip into a recession in the next quarter. If it does, then 
pursuing a certain investment will predictably result in losses and, 
potentially, company-wide layoffs. In turn, this would create a 
significant net loss of happiness. Suppose on the other hand that the 
economy does not slip into a recession. Then, the same investment 
would result in higher profits and bonuses for a small number of 
employees, and no lay-offs, in turn, creating a slight net gain of 
happiness. Given that the probability assigned to the recession occurring 
is 50%, the utility-maximizing action would be to abstain from the 
investment. However, in a different probability distribution where the 
recession was extremely unlikely, pursuing the investment could be the 
utility-maximizing action. 
Other consequentialist theories differ from Act Utilitarianism. As 
previously mentioned, one would countenance a different outcome by 
employing different consequences that matter morally other than 
happiness, or by using a decision rule other than maximization to 
determine the right consequences. For example, perhaps there are 
multiple good consequences that should be considered rather than only 
happiness, such as aesthetic value, truth, freedom, and so forth. Or 
perhaps rather than maximizing good consequences, it is enough to 
reach some minimally-adequate threshold of good consequences. Most 
consequentialists have been less attracted to these alternatives, as they 
tend to clutter and confound an otherwise very elegant moral theory that 
simply directs people to create the most happiness. 
Act Utilitarianism applied straightforwardly to the world of 
corporate decision-making would have some surprising implications. 
For example, a corporate director attempting to maximize utility might 
decide that dissolving the corporation would create the greatest balance 
of happiness over unhappiness in the world. After all, according to Act 
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Utilitarianism, no one’s happiness receives higher priority than anyone 
else’s.111 While shareholders might be very unhappy with the directors’ 
decision, their happiness would count for no more than the happiness of, 
say, a worker somewhere in the corporation’s global supply chain, an 
asthmatic person living in close proximity to air pollution generated by 
the corporation, or even a future person who is impacted by changes in 
the global climate for which the corporation is partly responsible. 
Furthermore, there is a built-in restraint of sorts in Act 
Utilitarianism against extreme pursuit of profit because money has 
diminishing marginal utility. Each additional dollar gained increases 
one’s happiness less than the previous dollar; $1,000 means much more 
to one living in poverty than to a millionaire. For this reason, increasing 
shareholder value when shareholders are already likely among the 
wealthier members of society is unlikely to be a utility-maximizing 
action. It would seem far better to redistribute those resources, at least in 
the short-term, to those for whom money has a higher value. 
Nevertheless, there are theorists who view Act Utilitarianism as 
consistent with the pursuit of profit and who even offer Act Utilitarian 
theories of corporate governance.112 Taking the long-run view, and 
paired with certain liberal views about the value of markets, pursuing 
profit can potentially be seen as utility maximizing. The current historic 
lows in global poverty are plausibly attributable to market liberalization 
in the developing world and the kind of Pareto improvements that 
market interactions enable.113 Without the profit motive, these 
improvements would not have occurred. So, although individual market 
transactions might not seem to maximize utility, a market-based system 
in the aggregate plausibly does. Or, at least it seems to produce greater 
net happiness than any other alternative. If good results are only possible 
by allowing or encouraging the pursuit of profit, then a view like 
shareholder primacy might be given a consequentialist (or Act 
Utilitarian in particular) moral grounding. 
 
 111. This feature of Act Utilitarianism is most famously attributed to Bentham as his 
dictum “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one.” See MILL, supra note 
110, at 53. 
 112. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 239 (2002). 
 113. Not Always with Us, THE ECONOMIST (June 1, 2013), https://www.
economist.com/briefing/2013/06/01/not-always-with-us [https://perma.cc/4M3V-RE8M]. 
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This is the view taken by Professors Hansmann and Kraakman in a 
2001 law review article arguing for shareholder primacy.114 But the 
underlying consequentialist framework is open to different 
interpretations. One might also construct a stakeholder view out of 
consequentialist considerations. If “stakeholder” is interpreted broadly 
enough to include everyone (and everything) whose interests are 
potentially affected by the firm, then maximizing stakeholder interests 
amounts to the same thing as maximizing utility. Finally, Joseph Heath’s 
market failures approach (discussed below) could also be grounded in 
consequentialism.115 Taking the same idea that only well-functioning 
markets tend to maximize utility, Heath’s approach could be viewed as a 
check on pursuing profits that coheres neatly with the general directive 
to maximize utility. 
This leads to the first major problem with directing corporate 
directors and managers to simply act morally: moral theories do not 
often precisely apply themselves to the kinds of decisions directors face. 
As a result, they underdetermine which actions are morally permissible. 
Because of this, there is no way to legally operationalize a directive to 
simply act morally. Imagine there was broad agreement that Act 
Utilitarianism is the one true moral theory. Even if we say, “act morally, 
by which we mean maximize utility,” this directive has been variously 
interpreted as implying everything from the wrongfulness of pursuing 
profit to the moral requirement to pursue profit. One corporate director 
might interpret “maximizing utility” to mean that the corporation should 
be dissolved, and another may understand it to mean that shareholder 
profit ought to be maximized. There simply is no useful guidance here at 
the generalized level of Act Utilitarianism, let alone at the even more 
generalized level of “act morally.” 
This leads to the second major problem with directing corporate 
directors to act morally: There is no consensus on which moral theory, 
or family of moral theories, is the correct one. Interpretations of Act 
Utilitarianism vary widely, but this is only one of many different moral 
theories, belonging to the family of consequentialism. If we turn to 
consequentialism’s main rival family, deontology, we find a myriad of 
 
 114. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001). This article illustrates the consequentialist moral 
theory through profit-maximizing shareholders by providing examples in the way of the 
“case of controlling shareholders (‘controllers’) who wish to maximize their financial 
returns.” Id. at 460. 
 115. See infra Part IV. 
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other moral theories, each of which face the same problems of 
interpretation and application that plagued Act Utilitarianism.116 Here 
though, a new problem presents itself. Even if we could agree on an 
interpretation and application of a certain theory to the actions of 
corporate directors—for example, suppose we agree that according to 
Act Utilitarianism, directors ought to maximize profit—why should we 
be confident that the theory itself is the correct theory. 
Within the deontological family, there is Rights Theory, which 
articulates a constellation of rights, both positive (the right to speak 
freely) and negative (the right to not to be killed), and explains who 
possesses which rights, and in virtue of what, and how rights interact.117 
There is also Kantian Ethics, which distills our moral duties ultimately 
to what is known as the Categorical Imperative. Perhaps the most 
commonly cited formulation of the Categorical Imperative directs us to 
respect others by always treating them as ends, and never as mere 
means.118 There is also Rossian Pluralism, which directs us to follow a 
number of prima facie duties, or standing moral obligations, to which 
we should adhere unless they conflict with other prima facie duties.119 
There is also Contractualism, which directs us to follow whichever 
moral rules would be agreed upon under certain idealized social-contract 
conditions.120 And on, and on. Each theory branches, in turn, with 
different theorists defending different versions of each. 
 
 116. If we move away from simply considering the consequences of actions and 
instead take on various deontological concepts like rights, duties, etc., we are no closer 
to determining who corporate directors ought to act. Do they have a duty to honor an 
implicit promise made to shareholders? (See Friedman, supra note 42.) Or, should they 
reduce profitability out of respect for the dignity of each stakeholder? Deontological 
theories give us no clearer account than Act Utilitarianism did. 
 117. For one account, see JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990). 
 118. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS 42 (Rev. Henry Calderwood, 
LLD., 3rd. ed. 1871). The primary sources of Kant’s ethics are the CRITIQUE OF 
PRACTICAL REASON, and the GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS. See 
generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott, B.D., 4th ed. 1889). Contemporary defenders of Kantian Ethics include 
Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood. See CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, CREATING THE 
KINGDOM OF ENDS 7 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). See generally ALLEN WOOD, 
KANTIAN ETHICS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
 119. See W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1930). 
 120. Perhaps the best known defender of Contractualism is T.M. Scanlon. See 
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 5 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998). 
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Then, there is the third whole family of moral theories, virtue 
ethics, which shifts the moral focus away from actions toward character. 
Virtue ethics directs people to exercise phronesis, or a kind of practical 
wisdom, as they strive to emulate the virtues of certain moral 
exemplars.121 While this is a very abridged and incomplete survey of 
theories, it is surely enough to convince the reader of the merits of the 
second major problem with asking directors to simply act morally: there 
is nothing close to a consensus among moral theorists about what that 
would amount to. 
Moreover, it does no good to instead appeal to something like 
conscience, if by “conscience” we simply mean the direct moral 
judgment of directors. In that case, telling directors to act in accordance 
with their conscience leads to the same problems as telling them to act 
morally. The verdicts of people’s consciences vary as widely as the 
verdicts of various moral theories and their interpretations. For example, 
a director might be following her conscience when she votes to dissolve 
the corporation or when she pursues shareholder profit above all else. If, 
on the other hand, “conscience” involves not just a moral judgment, but 
something volitional that compels someone to either act or abstain from 
acting in a certain way, we believe that the current legal framework 
accounts for this. If a director cannot in good conscience maximize 
shareholder value for the firm, that director should resign. On the other 
hand, if their conscience, or the application of whichever moral theory 
they believe to be true, directs them to, say, sabotage or defraud their 
corporation, then even if that is in fact morally required, the law cannot 
condone such behavior. It may sometimes be the case that one is 
morally required to break the law–for example, to effect social change 
through civil disobedience, or because one lives under an immoral legal 
regime. Perhaps the corporation is engaged in activity so immoral (but 
legally protected) that merely resigning from one’s position is morally 
insufficient. So be it. Doing the right thing may sometimes require the 
courage to face legal, even criminal, repercussions. The law simply 
cannot be tailored in such a way that it accommodates each discrete 
moral judgment, even if the judgment is correct. 
Despite the aforementioned widespread disagreement among moral 
theorists, it would be a mistake to conclude that there are no shared 
 
 121. Aristotle is the original and most famous virtue ethicist. Contemporary 
defenders include Alasdair MacIntyre and Linda Zagzebski. See ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 10 (1985); LINDA ZAGZEBSKI, VIRTUES OF THE MIND 13 
(1996). 
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judgments among theories. Although Kantian Ethics and Act 
Utilitarianism will disagree about why theft is wrong, both theories 
agree that it generally is wrong. Where there are such shared judgments, 
moral theories can provide a useful and operationalizable framework for 
legally prohibiting certain kinds of corporate bad behavior. In fact, if the 
theory of shareholder primacy is to have any plausibility as either an 
ethical or a legal theory, it must accommodate these minimal moral 
restraints. No moral theory would condone maximizing shareholder 
value no matter what.122 And neither does the law allow maximizing 
shareholder value no matter what. Some corporate actions, though 
profitable, are not legal. So, although we think that it is too simplistic to 
say that the law ought to encourage directors to behave morally, we do 
think that in cases in which there is broad shared moral judgment, 
among moral theories or in public sentiment (the collective conscience, 
so to speak), that an action which is legal is nevertheless seriously 
wrong, this is some indication that a new legal prohibition may be 
required. The current legal framework might then be expanded to 
address any gaps between that framework and these shared moral 
judgments.123 
A. THE SHARED MORAL JUDGMENT CONSTRAINT IN PRACTICE 
The recurring controversy over prescription drug pricing provides a 
useful case in which the existence of a shared moral judgment against a 
legal corporate action provided a framework for new regulation. 
 
 122. We reject shareholder primacy as an ethical theory for roughly these reasons, 
even though we think it is perhaps the best legal framework we have available at 
present. As an ethical theory, shareholder primacy would either say that directors have a 
moral duty to maximize shareholder value no matter what, or that they have a moral 
duty to maximize shareholder value so long as it is morally permissible. The first option 
faces obvious counterexamples. The second option is to make shareholder primacy 
vacuous as an ethical theory. Why, and under which circumstances, it is morally 
permissible to maximize shareholder value is exactly what we would want a moral 
theory to tell us, not something to be left as a placeholder. Jason Brennan and others 
offer similar criticisms of shareholder primacy as an ethical theory. Jason Brennan, 
Review of “Morality Competition and the Firm: The Market Failures Approach to 
Business Ethics,” 26 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 3–4 (2016). 
 123. Or, conversely, the legal framework might need to be attenuated if it prohibits 
corporate action about which there is broadly shared moral approval. 
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A recent prescription drug controversy, wherein pharmaceutical 
companies dramatically raised prices on certain drugs,124 invites the 
claim that the corporate actors making these decisions are, at best, 
morally callous and, at worst, deeply immoral. While other instances of 
bad corporate behavior could be cited, the drug pricing controversy 
places the stakeholder philosophy in sharp relief. Mylan Laboratories, 
NV, which produced the EpiPen (an auto-injector for epinephrine, 
which reverses life-threatening allergic reactions) increased its price by 
450%.125 The ensuing controversy demonstrates that Mylan’s decision 
makers did not weigh (or weighed inadequately) the effect of the 
decision on a core corporate constituency, Mylan’s customers. 
Apparently, Mylan determined that a dramatic price increase, while it 
may reduce unit sales, would increase Mylan’s profits. So, the decision, 
at least nominally, was consistent with the best interests of Mylan’s 
shareholders.126 
At the same time, the price increase was clearly very adverse to the 
interests of Mylan’s customers, and if Mylan had adopted a stakeholder 
approach, it would have had to weigh those interests. Setting aside for 
now the issues raised with stakeholder theory, the EpiPen price increase 
seems to be a significant challenge to shareholder primacy, and hence, at 
least initially a point in favor of its rival. At least stakeholder theory has 
an explanation of why the EpiPen price increase was objectionable, and 
an explanation could ultimately figure into some sort of revision to the 
legal framework. If nothing corresponds to this explanation within 
shareholder primacy, then shareholder primacy might not be an ideal 
underpinning for the relevant legal framework. 
There is a mechanism, however, within the existing shareholder 
primacy paradigm that could address the EpiPen controversy–the 
previously discussed constraint imposed by shared moral judgments. We 
 
 124. ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES 
PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 16 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) 
(“Even after factoring in average discounts of 37 percent in 2015 for the drugs studied, 
list prices still increased anywhere from 22 percent to a whopping 442 percent from 
2009 to 2015” (citing Robert Langreth, Michael Keller, & Christopher Cannon, 
Decoding Big Pharma’s Secret Drug Pricing Practices, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 29, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/R6NN-
V63Y])). 
 125. See id. 
 126. While it is likely that in the case generally pricing decisions are not made by 
the board of directors, the discussion is relevant because the board could intervene or 
set a policy that would bind management. 
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already accept all kinds of legal checks on maximizing shareholder 
value. Companies cannot determine how to dispose of industrial waste, 
compensate employees, keep their books, or any number of other actions 
solely to maximize profit. The legal constraints already in place are, in 
many cases, grounded in common public moral sentiment or the shared 
judgment of many moral theories. The public outrage over the EpiPen 
controversy should act as a warning for potential modification of the 
existing legal paradigm. 
Closer examination of the case reveals a couple of unusual features. 
First, given the presence of insurance and the ability of insurance 
companies to negotiate, was the effective price increase as high as it was 
reported? Second, why was it that a manufacturer of the device could 
profitably raise the price so much? In other words, to what extent should 
we look outside of the corporation for a solution to such a controversy? 
The answer to these questions starts with the understanding that 
prescription drug pricing takes place in an unusual market.127 First, 
many prescription drugs are under active patents, giving the 
manufacturer considerable pricing freedom. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that even patented drug prices are often, and significantly, 
restrained by pressure from insurers and their affiliated “pharmaceutical 
benefit managers.”128 Second, and perhaps more importantly, federal law 
prohibits Medicare from negotiating with pharmaceutical companies 
over price, which greatly enhances the pricing control of the 
manufacturers.129 Were the government able to negotiate over price, 
most analysts believe that the effect would be a downward pressure on 
prescription drug prices.130 Third, federal law also prohibits the re-
importation of prescription drugs.131 Other countries can and do 
negotiate with U.S. pharmaceutical companies and are able to secure 
prescription drugs at a much lower price than U.S. consumers pay.132 A 
 
 127. Feldman, supra note 124, at 19 (“[A] mix of dysfunctional market dynamics, 
strong intellectual property protection, and regulation has led to the complicated, 
expensive situation we have in the United States.”). 
 128. Id. at 15–16. In addition, “many pharmaceutical companies provide co-pay 
coupons or rebates directly to [consumers],” lowering their direct cost, although the 
consumer’s insurer continues to bear the bulk of the cost. Id. at 17. 
 129. Id. at 18. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 21 C.F.R. § 203.10 (1999). 
 132. Feldman, supra note 124, at 5 (“[O]ne drug that costs less than $400 a year in 
some countries has a list price around $300,000 in the United States.” (citing Bethany 
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more active import market would also place considerable downward 
pressure on drug prices. 
Fourth, the barriers to entry to manufacture generic replacements 
for patented drugs (when the patent expires) are extremely high. The 
patent on epinephrine has expired, and the drug can be manufactured 
generically. However, the costs and time delays to achieve approval by 
the Food and Drug Administration to produce a competitor to the 
EpiPen are extraordinarily high.133 For instance, in fiscal year 2014, the 
FDA received nearly 1,600 applications for approval of new generic 
drugs, but by the end of the fiscal year none had been approved.134 
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies have a host of tactics that they 
regularly employ to delay the introduction of generic substitutes to their 
patent-expiring drugs.135 Finally, provisions of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) require insurance companies to provide coverage for prescription 
drugs, and a prescription drug coverage gap in Medicare Part D was 
closed.136 These provisions dramatically increased the demand for 
prescription drugs, and the ACA did nothing to increase the supply or 
otherwise regulate pharmaceutical companies. In short, U.S. laws 
virtually guarantee that drug prices will be high relative to 
manufacturing cost. Trusting a theory of corporate governance to limit 
price increases seems misplaced. 
All of this suggests that this case highlights flaws in the existing 
legal framework. How these flaws should be redressed is beyond the 
scope of this article. Perhaps various market failures should be corrected 
 
McLean, The Valeant Meltdown and Wall Street’s Major Drug Problem, VANITY FAIR, 
June 5, 2016, www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/the-valeant-meltdown-and-wall-streets-
major-drug-problem)). 
 133. See Jeremy A. Greene, Gerard Anderson & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Role of the 
FDA in Affordability of Off-Patent Pharmaceuticals, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 461, 461 
(2016). 
 134. Michael Hiltzik, The FDA Can Single-Handedly Reduce Drug Price-Gouging. 
Why is It Waiting?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016, 12:32 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-fda-can-single-handedly-stop-20160105-column.html 
[https://perma.cc/7JQE-AFBK]. This is not an article, of course, to analyze the drug 
approval process in the United States, but this reality helps explain how such price 
increases can occur in an economy that depends on competition and free market 
principles. Regulation is supposed to act as a check against market failures, but in this 
instance, regulation is the cause of the market failure. 
 135. For an excellent analysis of these tactics, see Feldman, supra note 124, at 10. 
 136. Caitlin Owens, Why Prescriptions Drugs Aren’t Part of Obamacare, MORNING 
CONSULT (Mar. 24, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://morningconsult.com/2016/03/24/why-
prescription-drugs-arent-part-of-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/PWG4-6Y8A]. 
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in order to create a more competitive market for prescription drugs. 
Maybe the government should impose price controls on certain 
pharmaceutical products. For our purposes, the point is that these steps 
can all be taken within the existing shareholder primacy paradigm. As 
we argued earlier, no serious theory, moral or legal, would say that 
directors should maximize shareholder value no matter what. The 
existing legal paradigm can and does accommodate those cases in which 
common public sentiment and the shared moral judgment of various 
moral theories reject as immoral the directive to maximize profit. 
Perhaps these accommodations appear to be too piecemeal and ad hoc. 
Perhaps there is a superior paradigm that more elegantly matches the 
law to our shared moral judgments in a way that is both intuitive and 
operational. Perhaps. But, this superior alternative has yet to be 
articulated. 
III. THE LAWYER’S DUTY TO ZEALOUSLY REPRESENT THE CLIENT:  
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
Like directors, lawyers are fiduciaries for their clients, owing 
clients the same fiduciary duties that directors owe to their corporations. 
Indeed, the common understanding is that lawyers have a duty to 
“zealously” represent their clients. Much has been written on the 
lawyer’s duty, including a rich literature on whether the lawyer may 
deviate from the duty of zealous representation.137 This literature exists 
because lawyers, like directors, often face what might be termed as 
moral dilemmas. For instance, may a defense counsel, without the 
consent of the client, disclose to the plaintiff’s lawyer that the latter is 
laboring under a misunderstanding of the law when the result of the 
disclosure will be that the defendant will likely have to increase a 
settlement offer?138 Of course, disclosure under these circumstances is 
contrary to the notion of zealous representation and so must be justified 
on some basis. One could make a moral argument that disclosure is 
 
 137. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT: Preamble & Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) 
(“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the 
adversary system.”). See, e.g., Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 606 (Mich. 1981) 
(noting that a “reasonableness” standard to judge a lawyer’s advocacy would be 
“difficult to reconcile with the lawyer’s obligation to represent his client’s interests 
zealously. ‘Zealous representation’ contemplates that the lawyer will go to the limits for 
his client, representing him loyally, tenaciously and single-mindedly.”). 
 138. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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appropriate because otherwise there will be a perversion of justice. But 
to make this argument, one must also define and cabin the basis for the 
exception. What sort of moral exceptions to zealous representation are 
appropriate? 
Scholars grappling with this question have generated a plethora of 
explanations. For instance, Professor Tim Dare has argued that lawyers 
operate within a system designed to assure that society’s institutions 
function properly and, in that context, the “role of the lawyer is to allow 
clients to avail themselves of rights allocated to them by social 
institutions.”139 But, Dare sees this as limiting the lawyer’s role to acting 
with “mere-zeal,” eschewing “hyper-zeal.”140 The line between the two 
is nuanced, but the conclusion is that the lawyer would be restrained 
from acting in the best interests of the client to the extent that those 
interests exceed that to which the client is “entitled.” Therefore, in the 
disclosure hypothetical above, the lawyer could disclose to opposing 
counsel (to his client’s detriment) the legal misunderstanding. Other 
scholars have similarly identified various theories to limit a lawyer’s 
duty of loyalty to her client in order to further some moral objective.141 
The fundamental shortcoming of these theories is they fail to 
grapple with the underlying question of why lawyers have a duty of 
zealous representation in the first instance. Logically, when one 
identifies what underlies the duty, one can more easily consider whether, 
and to what extent, exceptions to the duty may be made. In his article, A 
Private Law Defense to the Ethic of Zeal, Professor Charles Silver 
persuasively argues that a lawyer’s duty to zealously represent a client is 
a simple application of traditional, well-established agency law 
principles.142 Further, those principles do not allow the lawyer to act on 
ethical or moral concerns not otherwise embodied in the law without the 
client’s consent. Why? As any fiduciary, the lawyer must act in the best 
interests of his client. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, to a 
large extent, codify the common law fiduciary duties and, with certain 
limited exceptions, do not permit a lawyer to make disclosures or 
otherwise take actions that are contrary to the client’s interests unless 
 
 139. Tim Dare, Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal, and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers, 7 
LEGAL ETHICS 24, 32 (2004). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Charles Silver, A Private Law Defense to the Ethic of Zeal 8 (Univ. Tex. L. 
Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 638, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2728326. 
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the client gives informed consent.143 It is beyond the scope of this article 
to further consider the theories that might or might not justify the duty 
of zealous representation. Rather, we will consider to what extent the 
robust version of the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation may inform 
the way directors act. 
In our view, the short answer is, like lawyers, directors have a 
robust duty to act in the best interest of the corporation that they serve. 
Their power to act and legitimacy emanates from their “contract” with 
their shareholders, and unless that contract contains exceptions, the 
shareholders’ reasonable expectation that the directors will act in the 
best interests of the corporation. Importantly, the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws (or even a shareholder-approved resolution) can 
alter that expectation, but the absence of such a modification leaves the 
morally troubled director with little choice other than resignation, much 
like a lawyer who is troubled by a course of action that the client insists 
the lawyer pursue. In the disclosure hypothetical noted above—where 
opposing counsel is laboring under a misunderstanding of the law—the 
lawyer cannot make a disclosure because of the likely harm to her client; 
her only choice is to resign.144 
Are there differences between a lawyer and a director that might 
give a director greater freedom to act in a way that may not be in the 
corporation’s best interests? Directors are not technically agents of the 
shareholders, or for that matter, agents of the corporation; rather, the 
position of directors is sui generis.145 While true, this observation begs 
the question, because even though directors are not agents, they are 
fiduciaries and the salient inquiries are the content and source of those 
duties. There is little dispute that directors owe duties of loyalty, care, 
and good faith.146 Like a lawyer who must make a personal and moral 
decision of whether to represent a particular client, the critical point for 
a director is deciding whether to serve as a director. And, like a lawyer 
who is generally free to withdraw from a representation if continuing to 
do so is morally repugnant, the director is free to resign from her seat. 
 
 143. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). The exception 
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 144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 146. See In re Trados, Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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There is one salient difference between lawyers and directors worth 
considering. The lawyer faced with a moral dilemma, such as the 
disclosure hypothetical, can and should consult her client. The client, for 
any number of reasons, may decide that disclosure is appropriate and so 
notify the lawyer. A director of a publicly-held corporation does not 
have that luxury in most instances. While a board of directors can refer a 
matter to the shareholders for an advisory vote or a binding 
determination, this is an unusual and expensive procedure. Moreover, it 
is somewhat awkward: Shareholders have elected the directors to make 
the business decisions for the corporation and ought not to be called 
upon to do the directors’ work.147 Thus, directors are guided by the 
fiduciary obligations and work without the “safety net” that lawyers 
have in the form of consulting with and gaining the consent of clients. 
Since directors cannot consult with the beneficiaries of their 
fiduciary duties, ought they be free to guess whether their shareholders 
would opt not to maximize profits in a particular circumstance? This, 
too, seems like an avoidance of a fiduciary duty. The director’s duty is 
not to do what the majority of shareholders might think best, but rather 
to do what the director believes is in the corporation’s best interests. 
This concept finds support in the doctrine that a majority of shareholders 
cannot ratify a transaction that constitutes corporate waste; only 
unanimous shareholder approval can do so.148 
Although there may be circumstances in which maximizing profit 
clearly contradicts the director’s moral judgment, and even our 
collective moral judgment, there does not seem to be any way to 
operationalize the notion that, in these circumstances, the director 
should follow her own moral judgment, other than to allow the director 
to resign under these circumstances. To legally condone directors 
knowingly frustrating the profitability of their firm would be equivalent, 
in our view, to condoning lawyers knowingly frustrating their clients’ 
legal success. 
IV. THE MARKET FAILURE THEORY 
In his recent book, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM, 
Professor Joseph Heath offers a fresh approach to the debate about 
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director decision-making.149 He notes that stakeholder theorists do not 
adequately consider the importance of corporate law when arguing for 
stakeholder protections. If a firm’s managers favor non-shareholder 
constituents and its competitors do not, it will experience lower profits 
and become a target for hostile takeover. Heath explains that adherence 
to a norm of corporate social responsibility “significantly complicate[s] 
the agency relationships” between managers and the corporation, and he 
points to state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) as proof. SOEs are 
unsuccessful from a profit perspective, and a social responsibility 
perspective as well,150 because the managers have a multi-task problem. 
As there is “no common metric that can be used in a [triple bottom 
line]151 context for evaluating social and environmental performance 
relevant to other stakeholders . . . it is very difficult to see how any 
reform of corporate law designed to permit managers to pursue a [triple 
bottom line] agenda would not also open the door to rampant 
malfeasance.”152 Similarly, the fact that managers are accountable to 
more than one principal (Multi-Principal Problems) frees them from 
accountability to any principal. Heath also convincingly discusses the 
experience of SOEs in this regard.153 
Heath responds to these deficiencies with his “market failure 
approach,” which starts from the presumption that economies based on 
free markets are relatively efficient at allocating goods and services. 
This is because free markets generate accurate pricing of such goods and 
services. Efficient markets, however, depend on an accepted set of rules 
or norms binding on competitors in the marketplace. Heath suggests ten 
such rules, one of which is that competitors minimize negative 
externalities; costs associated with the goods or services they produce 
that are not factored into the price at which those goods and services are 
offered. The classic example is goods that are produced in a way that 
generates carbon emissions which, in turn, contribute to global warming. 
Unless that effect is somehow factored into the price, the price of the 
goods will not accurately reflect all production costs. Thus, the 
efficiency of the market is reduced. To counter this result and to ensure 
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the efficient allocation of goods and services to address this “market 
failure,” corporate managers have a moral obligation to act in a way that 
might not maximize profits, but will internalize the full cost of their 
product. 
Heath presents an elegant and forceful argument, but one that is 
ultimately unsatisfying as an alternative to the existing shareholder 
primacy paradigm in corporate law. Just as a firm’s attention to a triple 
bottom line will disadvantage it if its competitors are not similarly 
constrained, the market failure approach requires adherence by all 
competitors. Heath responds to this obvious shortcoming by suggesting 
ways this may be avoided, including legislation to allow firms to collude 
on non-productive forms of competition.154 But this and other 
suggestions provide only theoretical ways that managers might behave 
consistently with the market failure approach. As a practical matter, how 
would managers have to behave in the absence of such legislation? 
Typically, managers look for and exploit competitive advantages; the 
market failure approach presents a rationale for them to avoid doing so, 
but not a convincing reason that they in fact will. 
For this reason, we find Heath’s market failure approach to be a 
welcome and promising addition to the ethical question of what the 
purpose of a corporation is and what obligations it places on directors 
and managers. However, we also find it is not a satisfying alternative to 
shareholder primacy as the operant legal paradigm. Indeed, Heath’s 
approach is not too far off from a more ethically sophisticated 
understanding of shareholder primacy—that is, one like ours that 
acknowledges the need for ethical constraints on the underlying 
presumption of a profit motive. Heath’s idea that corporate directors 
have a moral obligation to eschew decisions that create Pareto 
inefficiencies, for example by rent-seeking behavior, could be re-
purposed under the existing framework by highlighting the need for 
additional regulation in exactly these sorts of circumstances. We 
imagine that there would be widespread, shared moral judgment that 
Pareto inefficient corporate behavior, like regulatory capture or 
monopolizing a market, is wrong or at least morally questionable. If that 
behavior is not legally prohibited, then the shared moral judgement 
constraint should be invoked, and new regulation crafted. 
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V. DELAWARE LAW: THE BLASIUS CASE 
In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,155 Chancellor William 
Allen, writing for the Delaware Chancery Court, identified the essence 
of the shareholder-director relationship which, if accepted, explains (and 
constrains) the directors’ authority to act. In that case, the Atlas board of 
directors rejected a restructuring proposed by Blasius, one of its 
shareholders.156 In response, and in order to realize its proposed 
restructuring, Blasius decided to obtain control of the Atlas board.157 
Blasius sought to persuade Atlas shareholders to consent to an 
expansion of the Atlas board and to the election of Blasius’s nominees 
to the newly created positions.158 The Atlas board moved swiftly to 
thwart the plan by amending its bylaws, expanding the size of the board, 
and adding its own nominees to the vacancies.159 Blasius sued for an 
injunction and prevailed.160 
In an incisive opinion, Chancellor Allen posed these facts in the 
starkest terms: He assumed that the Atlas board of directors was 
unconflicted, fully informed, and acted in good faith—the prerequisites 
that normally indicate a court will not interfere with the directors’ 
judgment.161 Allen added that he was “inclined to think [the Blasius 
restructuring proposal] was not . . . sound.”162 The issue, then, was 
whether, under such circumstances, the Atlas board could act “for the 
principal purpose of preventing the [shareholder] from electing a 
majority of new directors.”163 Chancellor Allen concluded that they 
could not, because the shareholders’ statutory power to elect directors 
provides the directors’ authority to act for the corporation: “[T]he 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”164 In other words, the directors 
cannot interfere with the shareholder voting process because their 
legitimacy depends on it. In that respect, the corporate voting construct 
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is not unlike the political process; a candidate who, say, interferes with 
voters casting their ballots loses all legitimacy to represent them. It is 
hard to argue with Allen’s analysis, which is grounded in both logic and 
Delaware’s corporate statute. 
For present purposes, then, the question is the extent this limitation 
on director power informs the ability of directors to act in other 
circumstances. Must directors act to further the interests of 
shareholders? A couple of points are worth noting. First, Chancellor 
Allen was untroubled by the lack of a formal principal-agent 
relationship between the shareholders and directors.165 Indeed, he used 
those terms to describe the relationship. Second, applying traditional 
agency principles, the agent must act in the best interests of the 
principal. To the extent that courts defer to the business judgments of 
directors, they do so because courts lack the expertise that directors 
presumably have. But, those business judgments must be in the best 
interests of the corporation and, by extension, in the best interests of the 
shareholders.166 A board decision that the shareholder can prove did not 
meet this standard will, like the decision of the Atlas board, be subject to 
injunction.167 
CONCLUSION: DO WE NEED NEW NORMS? 
In this article, we sought to establish whether and how the 
corporation should act in a more socially responsible fashion. If 
directors are to deviate from the norm that they are bound to act in the 
corporation’s best interests, then what justifies that deviation? This 
article considers a range of possible justifications: stakeholder theory, 
the team production theory, individual moral judgment, and the market 
failure rationale. All are found wanting as alternatives to the existing 
legal paradigm that assumes that maximizing shareholder value is a 
legitimate aim of directors. 
The existing shareholder primacy paradigm is only plausible if we 
allow the need for some moral constraints based on publicly widespread 
shared moral judgments. This constraint allows shareholder primacy to 
plausibly navigate cases like the EpiPen controversy, where the course 
that maximizes shareholder value seems immoral to too many 
stakeholders and observers. Besides the need for ethically informed 
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legal constraints on maximizing profit, it is also available to directors 
under the operant paradigm to resign in protest if their personal moral 
judgments conflict with maximizing shareholder value, analogous to 
how a lawyer may resign rather than zealously represent a client when 
that representation conflicts with her personal moral judgment. To 
legally operationalize the alternative, in which it is at a lawyer or a 
director’s discretion to contradict their fiduciary duties, would be 
unacceptable given the lack of a serious alternative to the agency law 
principles that inform a lawyer’s duty of zealous representation. Those 
principles underpin the leading Delaware case, Blasius, which clearly 
articulates the source of director authority and its limitations. 
Those who wish to see a change in this status quo should do more 
than just argue why it is a good idea. Delaware law, which governs the 
majority of publicly held corporations (where the call for social 
responsibility is most intense and consequential) does not currently give 
directors that unbounded discretion. The real challenge for those seeking 
the change, then, is to persuade the Delaware legislature to change its 
law, perhaps by adding an other-constituency provision. While that 
seems unlikely, proponents of change might turn to benefit corporations. 
One of the authors of this article has written of the promise of this new 
option, which mandates that corporate directors factor into their 
decisions the interests and concerns of a wide range of stakeholders, 
including the environment and society at large.168 The mere fact that the 
Delaware legislature has recently added provisions in its law allowing 
for the creation of benefit corporations (called “public benefit 
corporations” in Delaware) only strengthens the conclusion that the 
realm of traditional corporations remains profit maximization and 
shareholder primacy. It is even harder to argue now that the directors of 
a traditional Delaware corporation may take into account the effect of 
their decisions on non-shareholder constituencies, unless there are 
benefits that accrue to shareholders from such accounting. 
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